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ABSTRACT  
   
As automation becomes more prevalent in society, the frequency that systems 
involve interactive human-automation control increases. Previous studies have shown 
accountability to be a valuable way of eliciting human engagement and reducing various 
biases, but these studies have involved the presence of an authority figure during the 
research. The current research sought to explore the effect of accountability in the 
absence of an authority figure. To do this, 40 participants took part in this study by 
playing a microworld simulation. Half were told they would be interviewed after the 
simulation, and half were told data was not being collected. Eleven dependent variables 
were collected (accountability, number of resources shared, player score, agent score, 
combined score, and the six measures of the NASA- Task Load Index), of which 
statistical significance was found in number of resources shared, player score, and agent 
score. While not conclusive, the results suggest that accountability affects human-
automation interactions even in the absence of an authority figure. It is suggested that 
future research seek to find a reliable way to measure accountability and examine how 
long accountability effects last. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While accountability is a commonly utilized word in many facets of society, 
especially politics and business, there is surprisingly little research on how it fits into 
today’s technologically advanced world. Much of the accountability research over the 
years has looked at human-human interaction, but there is increasingly more human-
automation interaction in our daily lives. This change in types of interaction creates a 
whole new arena in which accountability should be studied, so we can properly design 
human-automation systems. Past research on accountability has shown that it has the 
ability to reduce certain biases (Tetlock, 1983a; Tetlock, 1985), promote more complex 
thought (Tetlock 1983b; Tetlock 1987), and increase performance (Skitka, Mosier, & 
Burdick, 2000; Shah & Bliss, 2017); but it is unclear if this previous research directly 
pertains to today’s human-automation systems.  
Humans often fail to effectively interact with automation, leading to issues such 
as reduced system resilience and inefficient system operation. This issue can be seen in 
many situations; such as people sleeping behind the wheel of self-driving vehicles, 
despite being aware that they are supposed to remain alert and ready to take control. 
Accountability is a promising tool for overcoming these negative conditions, by 
manipulating the abilities noted above. However, if human-automation systems are to 
reap the potential benefits of accountability in their designs there is still much research 
that needs to be completed. It is hypothesized that, even in the absence of an authority 
figure, accountability can be instilled in a manner which increases human engagement 
with automation thereby enhancing the performance of a human-automation system. 
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A literature review will seek to establish what we currently know about 
accountability, automation, and the studies performed on accountability up to this point 
which are most relevant to the social sciences, particularly as related to human-
automation systems. This paper will also present a discussion of some gaps in the current 
literature, and a research question based on these gaps is offered: will accountability have 
a significant effect on how participants collaborate with an interactive automation system, 
on how they rate their preparedness to account for their actions, and on how they perceive 
their workload, even in the absence of an authority figure moderating the study? The 
chosen study design and methodology for answering the question will be discussed. 
Results of the collected research data will be presented. Then, finally, a discussion of the 
implications of the findings, and potential next steps for understanding accountability, 
will be offered. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 Accountability. The concept of accountability is utilized in many areas of 
society. In the broadest of terms accountability can be seen as giving or demanding of 
reasons for conduct (Roberts & Scapens, 1985). Mulgan (2000) notes that accountability 
has been a dynamic concept, but the general consensus is that it regards the process of 
accounting for actions to some authority. Accountability frequently takes on different, yet 
similar, meanings across fields, depending on the context it is being used in. For instance, 
in public administration it is often viewed as power relationships between principal and 
agent, primarily referring to duties which agents owe to those with leverage and control 
of their tenure in office (Uhr, 1993). On the other hand, business often views 
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accountability as justification of actions and beliefs, often in the context of rewards or 
punishments (Gitter & Masicampo, 2007). 
 It is important to note that, while accountability and responsibility are often used 
interchangeably, the concept of accountability is fundamentally different from 
responsibility. Bivins (2006) notes that responsibility denotes predetermined explicit 
obligations, whereas accountability refers to the readiness to explain actions, intentions, 
judgments, or omissions to relevant others. While there is often significant overlap 
between responsibility and accountability, accountability does not rely on the existence of 
explicit obligations. Simply put, a responsibility is an obligation, and accountability is a 
preparedness to account. 
 Much of the accountability research literature focuses on public administration or 
management. Some valuable insights can be garnered from this research. In public 
administration four systems of accountability (bureaucratic, legal, professional, and 
political) have been identified; each system consists of either an internal or external 
source of control, and either a high or low degree of control over actions (Romzek & 
Dubnick, 1987). This is important because it informs of the impact that the sources and 
levels of control have on accountability. In business five forms of accountability are often 
recognized, those being political, managerial, public, professional, and personal (Sinclair, 
1995). These forms of accountability have varying effects on people, so understanding 
them is important when designing research, especially in the social sciences. 
 While the previously mentioned views and research on accountability are 
informative, they are not optimal for understanding accountability in the social sciences. 
In most fields, accountability is tied to understanding the outcomes of performance 
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expectations, and not necessarily the underlying motivators of accountability on people. 
Because of this difference in objectives, accountability in the social sciences may be 
viewed as “pressure to attend to more information and to also integrate this information 
in more complicated ways” (Skitka et al., 2000, p. 704). While the social sciences view 
may elicit accountability in similar manners to other fields, the outcomes are often 
viewed quite differently. Instead of simply seeking to understand why a performance 
objective was or was not met, the social sciences seek to understand how accountability 
affects many aspects of human thought and motivation. 
Human-human accountability studies. A handful of seminal studies on 
accountability have been conducted in the area of human-human interaction. These 
studies found accountability affects thought processes. Accountability was shown to 
reduce the primacy effect, causing individuals to ascribe less weight to the first 
information obtained than those in the nonaccountable condition (Tetlock, 1983a). It was 
also found to reduce the fundamental attribution error; the tendency to place more 
emphasis on internal explanations without properly taking the situational powers into 
account (Tetlock, 1985). Yet another finding on accountability was that it can cause more 
complex judgment processing; in that it motivates more vigilant, thorough, and self-
critical information processing (Tetlock & Kim, 1987). 
 A useful study that examines accountability’s impact on the overall complexity of 
thought was completed by Tetlock (1983b). It found that individuals either shifted their 
views or thought about them in a more complex manner when they believed they would 
have to justify their stance to someone with a different position. This study showed that 
when and how accountability is induced can be important to the outcome. Accountability 
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is a multi-faceted complex topic which still requires much research to utilize in the most 
efficient and effective way possible. 
 A review of the social sciences accountability literature found that, in most 
situations, the benefits of accountability were most pronounced when accountability was 
induced pre-decision, and to an unknown audience (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). While this 
finding is interesting, it is not optimal; in many real-world situations it is unlikely that the 
audience is unknown (e.g., managers, voters, etc.). It is also unclear if this research into 
human-human interactions directly correlates with human-automation interactions. In 
order to assess the research needs of the accountability topic, it is necessary to understand 
automation and how accountability has been studied in human-automation systems. 
 Automation. More and more frequently, automation is being integrated into our 
daily lives. Automation can be defined as the execution of a function, previously carried 
out by a human or one which could conceivably be carried out by a human, by a machine 
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). There are multiple factors which influence how people 
interact with automation. One important factor is the level of automation. The literature 
on levels of automation range from comprehensive listings of the levels and how they are 
distinguished (Sheridan, 1992; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000), to abbreviated 
levels simply ranging the automation level between no automation and full automation 
(Parasuraman, 2000). Another important factor is the level of control a human has in the 
human-automation system, viewed as manual, advisory, interactive, supervisory, or 
automatic control (Van Wezel, Cegarra, & Hoc, 2010). As we know from research in the 
public administration domain, control can be a critical variable in accountability. 
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 Generally speaking, levels of automation and control can affect not just how 
people use automation, but how they misuse it, whether it becomes disused, and even if 
its use becomes abused (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). The levels of automation and 
control can also have a profound impact on the mental state of the people utilizing the 
automation. Some of the areas which can be affected by automation are mental workload, 
situational awareness, complacency, and skill degradation (Parasuraman, 2000). These 
are often the types of effects social scientists are interested in when it comes to human-
automation systems, and it is these areas that are likely to be affected by accountability. 
 As automation becomes more and more prevalent in all areas of society the 
relationships between humans and automation become more complex, and eliciting the 
proper interaction becomes more important. In the past, much of the automation involved 
either advisory or supervisory control, but more automation is now utilizing an 
interactive type of control. This dynamic coordination to accomplish a task can be viewed 
as interactive team cognition (Cooke, Gorman, Myers, & Duran, 2012). To achieve 
interactive team cognition between humans and automation requires flexibility and 
proper engagement of system participants (Flemisch et al., 2012). Achieving a form of 
interactive team cognition in human-automation systems is one area where accountability 
may be beneficial, but more knowledge on accountability in human-automation systems 
is required. 
 Studies of accountability in human-automation systems. As of today, few 
studies on accountability in human-automation interaction have been published. The two 
studies which were found focused on supervisory control, and measured 
observed/unobserved errors as a critical dependent variable (Skitka et al., 2000; Shah & 
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Bliss, 2017). These studies found that accountable participants had significantly different 
scores in their observation tasks than nonaccountable participants. This proved that 
scoring metrics can be a valuable tool for assessing the behavioral difference between 
those being held accountable and those not being held accountable. While these studies 
are informative, and certainly add value to the existing accountability literature, the focus 
on supervisory control means they are concerned not with effective human-automation 
interactions, but rather on effective human monitoring of the automation. It is possible 
that the outcomes of accountability may be different depending on the level of 
automation and type of control. 
 In an article by Cummings (2006), it is pointed out that understanding 
accountability in human-automation systems can inform design of these systems in a 
manner that reduces biases and increases system functioning. The existing literature 
regarding human-human and supervisory human-automation interaction (involving 
accountability) may pertain to other types of human-automation interaction, but more 
research is needed to establish a correlation. Given the minimal amount of existing 
literature on this topic, it is easy to see that this is a relatively unexplored area. An 
important area which has remained unexplored in the accountability literature is how to 
measure accountability. 
 Measuring accountability. While researching the accountability literature no 
way of measuring accountability was found. To assess accountability levels the following 
question is being proposed: How prepared do you believe you are to justify your 
decisions and actions in the game to an interviewer? Participants will answer this 
question by selecting a point on a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from “not at all 
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prepared” to “very prepared”. This question relies on face validity. A key component of 
accountability is the “accounting” for actions or decisions in an interview or 
interrogation. By asking the participant how prepared they are to justify their decisions 
and actions, it will show how mindful they were of their decisions and actions during 
game play, and therefore how accountable they felt during the game. It is hypothesized 
that the accountable participants will rate themselves as more highly prepared to justify 
their decisions and actions than will the nonaccountable participants. If this is the 
outcome achieved, then it will help to show that accountability can indeed be instilled 
even without the presence of an authority figure. It is also helpful, however, to examine 
how accountability impacts perceptions of workload if we are to understand the role 
accountability may play in human-automation interaction design. 
 NASA-Task Load Index (NASA-TLX). The NASA-TLX is a well-established 
research method, utilized to understand how individuals perceive the workload of a given 
task. The NASA-TLX, developed by Hart and Staveland (1988), asks subjects to 
subjectively rate a task on six factors; those being mental demand, physical demand, 
temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration level. By assessing these six 
metrics it is possible to gain information on the cognitive workload evoked during a task. 
This is valuable in the context of accountability, as an accountable individual whom is 
more actively engaged with automation should exert a higher cognitive effort, and will 
therefore likely experience a greater workload than a nonaccountable individual on many 
of these metrics (Salehi & Chiou, 2018). 
 Discussion of research gaps in accountability literature. Our current 
understanding of accountability shows promise for its ability to be effectively integrated 
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into human-automation system design. There is still much research to be done though, as 
there are currently significant gaps in the literature. The primary gap of interest in the 
current research is that it is unclear whether accountability will be effective in human-
automation systems in the absence of an authority figure. In the past literature the 
researcher posed as an authority figure and was present during the experiment. This 
presents a couple of potential issues for real-world application. The first being that in 
most situations it is unlikely that an authority figure will be in close proximity at all 
times. This leads to the second issue of social influence pressure on participants. 
Authority figures exert social influence which increases compliance (Cialdini & 
Goldstein, 2004). A well-known example of this involves research participants 
supposedly electrically shocking an unseen person at the authority figure’s prompting 
(Milgram, 1975). This is important because if individuals are willing to inflict harm on 
another person when an authority figure is present and instructing them to do so, 
authority is clearly going to affect accountability. 
A second gap, which was not researched in this study but should be in future 
studies, is whether accountability can be elicited in a manner which guides humans 
towards exerting more effort on a specific goal. Previous research focused on whether 
accountable and nonaccountable participants differed in behaviors, but not if those 
behaviors could be directed. Increasingly complex human-automation systems can be too 
cognitively demanding for an individual to be engaged in every aspect of the system, so it 
may be important to guide their engagement through directed accountability. An example 
of this is an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS); it is unrealistic to expect an individual to 
be engaged with every aspect of an incredibly complex UAS, without significant 
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cognitive overload, so it may be helpful to manipulate accountability to focus the 
human’s cognitive effort on desired metrics. While these desired metrics are likely to be 
different for each type of human-automation system, a UAS may focus on duties such as 
navigation, reconnaissance, or flight control. It is important to understand where the most 
human-automation collaboration is needed, in the given system, if accountability is to be 
directed properly. 
 A third gap of great interest, but beyond the scope of the current research, is that it 
is currently unknown how long the effects of accountability elicitation last. Most of the 
experiments appear to be short in duration. It is important to know if the effects of 
accountability are short-lived or long-lasting, as this can greatly influence system design. 
If accountability needs to be frequently reestablished it may not be beneficial to some 
system designs. 
 These are just a few of the gaps present in the accountability literature, especially 
as it relates to human-automation interaction. As stated before, there is much that still 
needs to be known about accountability to properly utilize it in many systems. It is a 
promising concept, but the research needs to be developed. It is with this in mind that the 
following research question has been investigated: does accountability have a significant 
effect on how participants collaborate with an interactive automation system, on how 
they rate their preparedness to account for their actions, and on how they perceive their 
workload, even in the absence of an authority figure moderating the study? 
Accountability has been shown to be effective in minimizing certain cognitive 
biases (Tetlock, 1983a; 1983b; 1985; Tetlock & Kim, 1987), reducing errors of omission 
and commission (Skitka et al., 2000; Shah & Bliss, 2017), as well as increasing human 
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performance in supervisory controlled human-automation systems (Skitka et al., 2000; 
Shah & Bliss, 2017); and interactive controlled human-automation systems are similar in 
that they frequently involve comparable human-agent interactions. It was, therefore, 
hypothesized that, even in the absence of an authority figure, accountability can be 
instilled in a manner which increases human engagement with automation thereby 
enhancing the performance of a human-automation system.  
The hypothesis was greatly informed by the existing literature. Previous research 
showed that accountability increases the complexity of thought (Tetlock, 1983b; Tetlock 
& Kim, 1987) and reduces automation bias (Skitka et al., 2000), thereby increasing 
human engagement in the researched systems. The existing literature also found that 
accountability increased the performance of supervisory controlled human-automation 
systems due to the increased human engagement; it is therefore believed that 
accountability will also increase the performance of an interactively controlled human-
automation system. This previous research was, however, carried out by researchers 
posing as authority figures, so the hypothesis researched in this study sought to remove 
the social influence presented by the close proximity of an authority figure. As stated, the 
hypothesis was informed by previous research, while attempting to delve into an 
unexplored area of accountability. 
Based on the hypothesis, it was predicted that when accountability is induced: 
accountable individuals would exhibit more preparedness for the need to account for their 
actions, an interactively controlled human-automation system would perform better on 
performance metrics, and accountable individuals would perceive their workload 
differently than nonaccountable individuals. More specifically, it was predicted that 
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accountable participants would rate themselves as more prepared to account for their 
actions and motivations than the nonaccountable participants, as rated by the proposed 
accountability question. For the performance metrics, it was predicted that accountable 
participants would share more resources due to a greater concern for the effectiveness of 
the holistic system, and they would obtain higher player scores, agent scores, and 
combined scores than the nonaccountable participants, due to their higher engagement 
levels. For the NASA-TLX workload measures, it was predicted that accountable 
participants would rate themselves higher on all six metrics: mental demand, physical 
demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration. Mental demand would be 
rated higher by accountable participants, due to the increased complexity of thought 
instilled by accountability. Physical demand would be higher in accountable participants, 
because they would be more engaged with the system, increasing physical activity. 
Temporal demand would be higher in accountable participants, as they would perceive a 
greater urgency regarding time. Accountable participants would rate themselves higher in 
performance due to their increased engagement with the system, therefore increasing 
confidence in their performance. Effort would be higher in accountable participants 
because of their increased engagement with the simulation. Finally, accountable 
participants would rate themselves higher on the frustration metric, due to the increased 
engagement, mental demand, physical demand, and temporal demand. 
METHODS 
Design 
The research used the basic randomized design comparing one treatment to a 
control. The independent variable of this research was social accountability (henceforth 
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referred to as “accountability” in this paper), operationally defined as pressure that 
motivates increased attention to greater amounts of information and a more sophisticated 
integration of this information. Testing of accountability consisted of one level: 
generalized accountability. Accountability, was implemented through the inclusion of a 
cue in the training, as discussed previously. A control group was utilized for comparing 
the accountable group to a nonaccountable group. The control group was told that data 
was not being collected due to a hard-drive malfunction; this story was facilitated by an 
external computer hard-drive being left unplugged in plain sight next to the study 
computer. By manipulating accountability, and by using a control group, the study was 
able to collect data to test the hypotheses. The design allowed for comparison between 
the accountability and non-accountability groups. 
 Data was collected on 11 dependent variables. Four performance variables were 
collected in the microworld simulation: (a) participant score, (b) agent score, (c) 
combined participant and agent score, and (d) number of resources shared. One 
dependent variable was collected by the proposed question to assess an individual’s level 
of accountability: (e) accountability. Finally, six dependent variables were collected 
through the NASA-TLX questionnaire, to assess perceived workload: (f) mental demand, 
(g) physical demand, (h) temporal demand, (i) performance, (j) effort, and (k) frustration 
level. All data was analyzed by performing t-tests for each dependent variable, comparing 
the accountable condition to the control. If the hypothesis is to be confirmed, the 
participants in the accountable condition will have significantly higher scores in the 
performance measures, they will rate themselves as more prepared, and will rate 
themselves higher on the NASA-TLX measures of mental demand, performance, effort, 
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and frustration level than the control group. The hypotheses could, however, be 
disconfirmed by a lack of significance found.  
Participants 
 The study utilized 41 participants (28 male, 12 female, 1 no response; Mage = 21, 
age range = 18 – 30). This particular study was too novel and exploratory to utilize 
existing studies for a power analysis so as to accurately estimate the needed sample size, 
but it was believed that this sample size would be adequate, based on assumptions made 
from previous studies. The participants were recruited from the Human Systems 
Engineering subject pool at the Arizona State University Polytechnic campus. The only 
exclusion criteria being that participants which are blind or have uncorrectable vision 
which renders them unable to accurately view a 15.6” computer monitor, from a distance 
of approximately 18 inches, would be excluded. Participants recruited from the subject 
pool received one class credit as partial fulfillment of course requirements, in accordance 
with the subject pool policies. 
Materials 
 The experiment was conducted in a lab in the simulator building at the Arizona 
State University Polytechnic campus. The lab is sparsely decorated, has two desks, three 
chairs, and two laptop computers. This sterile environment minimizes distractions and 
potential confounds stemming from perceptions garnered from extraneous visual stimuli. 
Microworld Simulation. The primary material used in this experiment is a 
microworld environment that simulates a hospital scheduling task (see Figure 1). In the 
simulation participants play the game jointly with a computer agent. This microworld 
environment was created in Java. The interface has four main sections (e.g., your panel,  
  15 
 
Figure 1: A screenshot of the microworld interface at the start of a trial. At the start, 
participants’ waiting rooms were less crowded relative to the agent’s waiting room. 
 
agent’s panel, rooms, and controls). The “Your Panel” display provides the number of 
patients in the participants waiting room (up to six of each patient type), displayed as dots 
with the dot’s color correlating with the number of that patient type (e.g., one-two = 
green, three-four = yellow, and five-six = red). It also shows the number of available 
resources (e.g., doctors, nurses, and surgeons) and the participant’s score (i.e., number of 
patients treated). The “Agent’s Panel” provides the same information as the “Your Panel” 
except the information is regarding the agent’s waiting room, available resources, and 
score. The agent’s panel, however, does not show the exact number of patients in their 
waiting room, it displays a colored square that follows the same color pattern listed 
above. The “Rooms” section displays the six rooms available for treating patients and 
whether they are vacant or occupied by a patient and the resources currently assigned to 
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the patient. The “Controls” section has buttons for assigning either patient type A, patient 
type B, a doctor, a nurse, or a surgeon to a room. This is accomplished by clicking on the 
desired resource and then clicking on a vacant room. In the “Controls” section there is 
also a “Give Resource” button, which when clicked allows the participant to share either 
a nurse, a doctor, or a surgeon with the agent. The interface also has a countdown timer 
displaying the time left in the trial. In this simulation the agent’s sharing behavior can be 
described as a “tit-for-tat” approach, in that it will share resources with the participant in 
a similar fashion as the participant shares with the agent. The pace of the game is 
designed so that when the participant experiences a high workload the agent experiences 
a low workload, and vice versa; the pace changes every four minutes. As mentioned 
before there are two patient types, patient type A requires a doctor, a nurse, and 45 
seconds to treat, and patient type B requires a surgeon, a nurse, and 60 seconds to treat. 
The player receives one point for each patient treated, of either type, in their hospital, 
while the agent receives one point for each patient treated in the agent’s hospital. It is 
important to note that the simulation is not meant to depict an actual hospital scheduling 
task, rather it was designed so that non-experts could complete the game, while creating 
an easy to understand narrative and goal (i.e., treat as many patients as possible). 
 To understand how accountability impacted participant’s behaviors, during the 
simulation, four performance metrics were recorded through the microworld simulation. 
Those metrics being: the total number of resources shared, the player’s total score, the 
agent’s total score, and the combined player/agent total score. The number of resources 
shared metric showed the total number of nurses, doctors, and/or surgeons each 
participant provided to the agent. This is an important metric, because the number of 
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resources available in the game are finite, so how they are utilized informs where a 
participant’s priorities lay. The total player/agent scores showed how many patients were 
treated in each respective hospital, with each treated patient resulting in a score increase 
of one point. The combined score was the sum of both the total player score and the total 
agent score. These scores are important because they allow an assessment of participant 
engagement with their hospital, the agent’s hospital, and the system as a whole. 
 Training. Training on how to utilize the microworld environment was presented 
through a self-studied PowerPoint presentation. The presentation explained each section 
of the interface and how to interact with the environment. A slide in the accountability 
groups presentation mentioned an interview after the game. The accountability group saw 
the following line in the training: “You will be interviewed by a subject-matter expert at 
the end of the experiment to justify your strategies”. The control group (nonaccountable 
group) did not have a slide mentioning an interview. 
 Accountability question. To assess the level of accountability displayed by 
participants this study asked the previously discussed question: “How prepared do you 
believe you are to justify your decisions and actions in the game to an interviewer?”. 
Responses to this question were collected using a seven-point Lykert-type scale, with 
participants being able to select a level of preparedness ranging from “not at all prepared” 
to “very prepared”. This data was coded numerically for quantitative analysis. 
 NASA-TLX questionnaire. This study is interested in how accountability affects 
aspects of perceived workload. Factors of the perceived workload were measured using 
the NASA-TLX (Task Load Index) questionnaire (see Appendix A for NASA-TLX 
questions). The NASA-TLX was chosen because it breaks workload into multiple factors, 
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allowing analysis of the individual components of task load so as to gain better 
information on how accountability impacts each factor. For this study the six factors of 
the NASA-TLX were measured using a 0-7 Lykert-type scale. Zero correlated with “low” 
and 7 correlated with “high” for five of the six factors (mental demand, physical demand, 
temporal demand, effort, and frustration level); the sixth factor (performance) used the 
same Lykert-type scale, but with zero correlating with “poor” and seven correlating with 
“good”. 
Demographic questionnaire. Some demographic information was collected in 
order to better understand certain aspects of the participants utilized in the study. The 
demographic information collected (see Appendix B for demographic questions) 
consisted of age, gender, education levels, and a range of questions assessing the 
participants use of technology. The questions in the demographic questionnaire were 
developed by the researcher. 
Procedure 
 Upon arrival at the lab, the participants were welcomed and asked to take a seat at 
the desk in front of the utilized computer. The participant was then given the informed 
consent to read; and upon completion of the reading, verbal consent was obtained by the 
researcher. The participant was then presented the training material on how to utilize the 
microworld simulation and instructed to ask any questions they may have during training, 
as the researcher would be unable to answer questions during the trial. Upon completion 
of the training the participant was given two practice trials, of two-minutes each, to 
ensure they were comfortable with the functionality of the interface. If the participant had 
no questions after the practice trials they were asked to begin the 16-minute main trial. 
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Once the main trial was finished, they were asked to complete three brief questionnaires: 
the accountability question, the NASA-TLX, and the demographic questionnaire. Upon 
completion participants were informed they had completed the study and thanked for 
their participation. 
RESULTS 
 Data was collected from 41 participants. Descriptive statistics were then obtained 
through analysis using the “Psych” package in R. As a result of the descriptive analysis 
one participant was removed from the accountable group due to a technical issue 
resulting in a failure to record the “agent score” through the microworld simulation. This 
resulted in two equal groups of 20 for each condition. 
The “stats” package was then utilized in R to run a series of Welch’s t-tests 
comparing the accountable group to the nonaccountable group for all 11 dependent 
variables (resources shared, participant score, agent score, combined score, 
accountability, mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, 
and frustration). It was hypothesized that, even in the absence of an authority figure, 
accountability can be instilled in a manner which increases human engagement with 
automation thereby enhancing the performance of a human-automation system. The 
analysis produced mixed results, with some variables supporting this hypothesis, while 
others did not support it (see Appendix C for table of observed statistics). 
Contrary to expectations, the accountable participants did not rate themselves as 
more prepared to account for their game play than did the nonaccountable group on the  
accountability measure, according to the observed means (Figure 2). In fact, surprisingly, 
the accountable group self-reported lower levels of preparedness to account (M= 5.55, SD  
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Figure 2: The observed means of participant preparedness to account, 
shown by group: Accountable (ACC) and Nonaccountable (NAC), with 
95% Confidence Interval (CI) bars. 
 
= 1.19) than did the nonaccountable group (M= 5.95, SD= 1.28); however, there was no 
significance in the accountability measure data (t(37.8)= -1.03, p= .312, d= .324). 
 It was hypothesized that accountable participants would score higher than the 
nonaccountable participants on the measures collected from the microworld simulation 
(number of resources shared, player score, agent score, and combined score). The mean 
scores of these measures (Figure 3) show that results of this hypothesis were mixed. For 
the number of resources shared measure, analysis showed the accountable group shared 
significantly more resources (M= 13.9, SD = 3.46) than the nonaccountable group did 
(M= 9.25, SD = 5.33; t(32.6)= 3.27, p< .01, d= 1.035). Analysis also found that the 
accountable group achieved significantly higher agent scores (M= 57.95, SD = 4.08) than  
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Figure 3: The observed means of the microworld simulation measures, shown by group: Accountable 
(ACC) and Nonaccountable (NAC), with 95% CI bars. 
 
did the nonaccountable group (M= 53.2, SD = 6.81; t(31.1)= 2.68, p= .012, d= .846). 
Contrary to expectation the accountable group achieved significantly lower player scores 
(M= 79.6, SD = 3.84) than did the nonaccountable group (M= 82.6, SD = 1.57; t(25.2)= -
3.23, p< .01, d= 1.022). No significance was found in analysis of the combined score 
measure when comparing the accountable group (M= 137.55, SD = 4.84) to the 
nonaccountable group (M= 135.8, SD = 6.43; t(35.3)= 0.97, p= .337, d= .308). 
Analysis of the NASA-TLX data, obtained through performing individual t-tests 
on each measure (mental demand, physical demand, temporal demand, performance,  
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Figure 4: The observed means of the NASA-TLX measures, shown by group: Accountable (ACC) and 
Nonaccountable (NAC), with 95% CI bars. 
 
effort, and frustration level), did not return any significant findings. Figure 4 shows the 
observed means of each of these measures. The accountable group self-reported slightly 
higher mental demand (M= 3.85, SD = 1.27) than the nonaccountable group (M= 3.75, 
SD = 1.68); however, the findings were not significant (t(35.3)= 0.21, p= .833, d= .067). 
The accountable group self-reported slightly lower physical demand (M= 1.35, SD = 
1.27) than the nonaccountable group (M= 1.95, SD = 2.19); again, the findings were not 
significant (t(30.1)= -1.06, p= .297, d= .336). The accountable group also self-reported 
slightly lower temporal demand (M= 3.25, SD = 1.45) than the nonaccountable group 
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(M= 3.45, SD = 1.47); the findings were not significant though (t(38)= -0.43, p= .667, d= 
.137). The accountable group self-reported lower performance scores (M= 5.35, SD = 
1.57) than the nonaccountable group (M= 5.8, SD = 0.89); however, the findings were not 
significant (t(30.2)= -1.12, p= .27, d= .353). The accountable group also self-reported 
lower effort levels (M= 3.10, SD = 1.33) than the nonaccountable group (M= 3.4, SD = 
1.82); but, again, the findings were not significant (t(34.9)= -0.6, p= .556, d= .188). 
Finally, the accountable group self-reported higher frustration levels (M= 1.8, SD = 1.51) 
than the nonaccountable group (M= 1.45, SD = 1.54); these findings were, however, also 
not significant (t(37.9)= 0.73, p= .472, d= .23). 
DISCUSSION 
 The implications of this study are wide-ranging and warrant an in-depth 
discussion. It is important, however, to begin this discussion by noting that the conducted 
research was exploratory and not meant to provide conclusions pertaining to the role of 
accountability in human-automation systems. There is still much to research on 
accountability before any conclusions can be made. This discussion simply seeks to 
provide an assessment of the results obtained, potential directions for future research, and 
an acknowledgment of the limitations of the current research. 
The results of the accountability measure, created for this experiment, did not 
support the hypothesis. While a lack of significance in the results is not terribly 
surprising, the nonaccountable participants self-reporting higher levels of preparedness to 
account than did the accountable participants, on average, was unexpected. More research 
would be required to accurately determine the reasoning this result was obtained or if the 
results are repeatable, however, it is believed this result was due to one of a couple 
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possible factors, or a combination of them. First, the nonaccountable participants were 
told that due to a technical issue data was not being collected and the researcher posed as 
uninformed research aid as opposed to an authority figure, this potentially led to 
increased confidence in the nonaccountable participants’ ability to account, as they 
believed there was nothing to dispute their account. Second, it is possible that 
accountability put pressure on the accountable participants which led to a reduced 
confidence in their preparedness to account. More research is needed to understand this 
outcome, however, performing this research could be beneficial for establishing a, much 
needed, measure of accountability which currently does not exist. 
The results of the performance metrics gathered from the microworld simulation 
partially supported the hypothesis. The accountable group sharing significantly more 
resources, than the nonaccountable group, shows a higher level of engagement in the 
well-being of the overall system. This greater level of resource sharing resulted in the 
accountable group obtaining significantly higher “agent score” scores than the 
nonaccountable group. The greater sharing of resources allowed the agent to treat more 
patients, and therefore obtain a higher score. This finding reinforces the stance that 
accountable participants were more engaged with the overall system than were the 
nonaccountable participants. While the finding that the accountable group had a 
significantly lower “player score” than the nonaccountable group contradicts the 
hypothesis that performance would increase in all performance metrics, in hindsight this 
finding makes sense. The higher level of resource sharing hindered the accountable 
participants’ ability to heal as many patients in their hospital, resulting in lower player 
scores. As stated, this result does not support the initial hypothesis, but may ultimately 
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show that accountable participants were willing to put their own needs behind those of 
the automated agent at times. The last game metric, “group score”, also contradicts the 
hypothesis. For this metric the accountable group scored slightly higher than the 
nonaccountable group, but the findings were not significant. The initial hypothesis was 
formed with the assumption that nonaccountable participants would be less engaged with 
the microworld simulation across all metrics, but it appears this belief did not hold true. It 
is possible that because the simulation was framed as a “game”, and participants could 
see scores during the simulation, this potentially induced motivation to engage more with 
the game than the participants may have otherwise. Further research which reduces these 
extraneous motivations may better show the effects of accountability on this particular 
human-automation system. Ultimately, however, the data collected from the game does 
more to support the hypothesis than it does to contradict it. 
The results of the NASA-TLX metrics did not support the hypothesis. Although 
none of the metrics were statistically significant, it is worth looking at the results a bit 
more closely. Interestingly, the accountable group self-reported lower scores than the 
nonaccountable group on four of the six metrics. The four metrics which the accountable 
group self-reported lower on were physical demand, temporal demand, performance, and 
effort. It is possible that because accountable participants shared more resources, they 
reduced their workload; therefore, requiring less physical and temporal demand during 
game play, and reducing the amount of effort needed, as they had fewer resources to 
manage in their own hospital. The lower self-reporting on the performance metric for the 
accountable group is potentially the result of reduced confidence as a result of the 
accountability, as previously discussed. The two metrics self-reported higher by the 
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accountable group, mental demand and frustration, may imply a higher cognitive load 
due to accountability in this research. The accountable group potentially perceived a 
higher mental demand due to their desire to take in a greater amount of information to 
ensure they prepared to account for their game play. It is possible that this greater 
cognitive effort also led to greater levels of frustration, however, the frustration is also 
potentially the result of having given away resources which they may have not received 
back when they would have liked. To better understand why exactly participants reported 
as they did further research would be required. 
While not all measures produced significant results, and some even point in the 
opposite direction of what was originally expected, it appears clear that inducing 
accountability had an effect on participants. Most notably, the significance found in the 
objective performance metrics is important, as these results show accountability had a 
significant impact on the human-automation system.  As mentioned throughout this 
discussion, though, much research is still needed to understand the effects of 
accountability. Manipulation of the accountability question and/or the microworld 
simulation may help to further answer the many questions that still need answered when 
it comes to accountability. 
It may be tempting to credit specific observed effects to competing theories, such 
as priming effects, but that would be erroneous. It could be argued that telling 
participants they will be interviewed elicits priming, and while it is true that this primed 
them to be accountable, the researcher was careful to avoid giving any indication that 
accountable or nonaccountable participants should act in any certain manner. This means 
that while they were primed to be accountable, their actions and behaviors were solely 
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the result of the accountability, not any specific priming. If priming is a concern, future 
accountability research would benefit from a longitudinal study design. While there is no 
consensus on how long priming effects last, the research of Squire, Shimamura, and Graft 
(1987) shows that “healthy” participants exhibited less influence from priming four days 
after the initial priming was elicited. By performing a well-designed longitudinal study, 
on accountability, researchers will be able to determine the duration of accountability 
effects while ruling out priming effects as a concern. 
Limitations 
The sample size constitutes a limitation. The sample size did not correlate with 
many of the effect sizes, therefore reducing the ability to find statistical significance. The 
sample size is also too small, and lacks appropriate diversity, to make conclusions 
regarding the larger population. This study will, however, provide data which will 
potentially help to inform the design of future studies.  
An important limitation is that this study did not analyze speed as a factor. It is 
possible that speed impacted some of the outcomes, especially the performance metrics. 
For instance, accountable participants may have obtained lower player scores due to 
slower reaction times stemming from increased cognitive effort. It would be beneficial 
for future accountability studies to measure speed, as it could provide valuable 
information on the impact of accountability on factors such as cognitive effort and 
decision-making speeds. 
Another limitation of this study involves the duration of the study’s length. This 
study lasted approximately 45 minutes, meaning it is unclear if the effects of 
accountability will hold up for a longer duration. This is important given that many 
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human-automation systems need to work collaboratively for long periods of time. No 
research has investigated the length of time accountability elicitation lasts; future 
research would benefit from investigating this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
This research has attempted to expand on the body of knowledge regarding 
accountability in human-automation interaction. Building on previous accountability 
research (Skitka et al., 2000; Shah & Bliss, 2017), the current research investigated the 
effect of accountability on a human-automation system in the absence of an authority 
figure. While results of the eleven dependent variables were mixed, it does appear that 
accountability had an impact on the behaviors of the participants in the accountable 
condition when compared to the nonaccountable condition. Most notably, accountability 
had a significant impact on metrics of the human-automation system’s performance. The 
accountable participants shared more resources with the automated agent, indicating an 
increased concern for the effectiveness of the automation. Accountable participants also 
obtained significantly higher agent scores, showing a greater engagement with the 
automation and a willingness to put the needs of the automation ahead of self at times. 
The argument that accountable participants were more engaged with the automation, than 
were the nonaccountable participants, is further strengthened by the finding that 
accountable participants had lower player scores than the nonaccountable participants, 
indicating that accountable participants behaved more selflessly. More research is needed 
if accountability is going to be utilized in the design of human-automation systems, but 
this research certainly constitutes a valuable contribution to our understanding of 
accountability and its potential use in system design. 
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APPENDIX A 
NASA-TLX QUESTIONNAIRE: FROM HART AND STAVELAND (1989) 
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Instructions: Place a mark on each scale that represents the magnitude of each factor in 
the task you just performed. 
 
 
1 Mental Demand How much mental and perceptual 
activity was required (e.g., 
thinking, deciding, calculating, 
remembering, looking, searching, 
etc.)? Was the task easy or 
demanding, simple or complex, 
exacting or forgiving? 
 
Low____________High 
2 Physical 
Demand  
How much physical activity was 
required (e.g. pushing, pulling, 
turning, controlling, activating. 
etc.)? Was the task easy or 
demanding. slow or brisk. slack or 
strenuous, restful or laborious? 
 
Low____________High 
3 Temporal 
Demand 
How much time pressure did you 
feel due to the rate or pace at 
which the tasks or task elements 
occurred? Was the pace slow and 
leisurely or rapid and frantic? 
 
Low____________High 
4 Performance How successful do you think you 
were in accomplishing the goals 
of the task set by the experimenter 
(or yourself)? How satisfied were 
you with your performance in 
accomplishing these goals? 
 
Poor___________Good 
5 Effort How hard did you have to work 
(mentally and physically) to 
accomplish your level of 
performance? 
 
Low____________High 
6 Frustration 
Level 
How insecure, discouraged, 
irritated, stressed and annoyed 
versus secure, gratified, content, 
relaxed and complacent did you 
feel during the task? 
 
Low____________High 
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APPENDIX B 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Age:  ________ 
   
Gender (circle):   Male  /   Female  /   Non-Binary  /   Prefer not to answer 
                                                            
Highest level of education:   You Your 
Father 
Your 
Mother 
Your 
Siblings 
Some high school or less     
High school diploma     
2-year college degree / trade school     
4-year college degree     
Master’s degree     
Professional degree     
Doctorate degree     
 
During the past three months, I did _____ hours voluntary jobs for society.  
 
If a current student, please list the following: 
 College ______________________________ 
Major _______________________________ 
Degree in pursuit of____________________ 
Number of years pursuing this degree ______ 
 
If employed, please write in your occupation: 
_______________________________________ 
 
I use a computer (Check only one): ____ Daily    ____ Every couple of days    
 ____ Once a week  ___ Every couple of weeks   ____ Less than once a month     
 ____ Never 
 
I use the computer for (Check all that apply): 
____  Looking up information 
____  Email 
____  Word processing 
____  Spreadsheets 
____  Computer games 
____  Other (Please specify) 
 
I play the following categories of video games (check all that apply): 
___ Sports     ___ Real-time strategy     ___ First person shooter     ___ Racing      
___ Role-playing (RPG)    ___ Puzzles    ___ Arcade      
Other ________________________ 
 
In the past six months, I have played video games on the following system type 
(check all that apply): 
___ Console     ___ Hand-held      ___ PC     
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I use the following technologies (check all that apply): 
____ Mobile phone    ____ PDA/Smart phone   ____ iPod/MP3 player    ____GPS 
Navigation  
 
How much experience do you have playing video/computer games? 
____ None     ____ less than 1 year      ____ 1 – 2 years      ____ > 2 years 
 
I play video/computer games (Check only one): ____ Daily    ____ Every few days    
 ____ Once a week   ____ Every few weeks   ____ Less than once a month     ____ Never 
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APPENDIX C 
TABLE OF OBSERVED STATISTICS 
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Measure Condition n M SD df 
t- 
value 
p- 
value 
Cohen's 
d 
Accountab-
ility 
ACC 20 5.55 1.19 
37.8 -1.03 0.312 -0.324 
NAC 20 5.95 1.28 
Resources 
Shared 
ACC 20 13.9 3.46 
32.6 3.27 0.002 1.035 
NAC 20 9.25 5.33 
Player 
Score 
ACC 20 79.6 3.84 
25.2 -3.23 0.003 -1.022 
NAC 20 82.6 1.57 
Agent 
Score 
ACC 20 57.95 4.08 
31.1 2.68 0.012 0.846 
NAC 20 53.2 6.81 
Combined 
Score 
ACC 20 137.55 4.84 
35.3 0.97 0.337 0.308 
NAC 20 135.8 6.43 
Mental 
Demand 
ACC 20 3.85 1.27 
35.3 0.21 0.833 0.067 
NAC 20 3.75 1.68 
Physical 
Demand 
ACC 20 1.35 1.27 
30.1 -1.06 0.297 -0.336 
NAC 20 1.95 2.19 
Temporal 
Demand 
ACC 20 3.25 1.45 
38 -0.43 0.667 -0.137 
NAC 20 3.45 1.47 
Performan-
ce 
ACC 20 5.35 1.57 
30.2 -1.12 0.27 -0.353 
NAC 20 5.8 0.89 
Effort 
ACC 20 3.1 1.33 
34.9 -0.6 0.556 -0.188 
NAC 20 3.4 1.82 
Frustration 
ACC 20 1.8 1.51 
37.9 0.73 0.472 0.23 
NAC 20 1.45 1.54 
n= number of participants, M= mean values, SD= standard deviation, df= degrees of freedom 
 
 
